General Von Kluck and the German Army
General Von Kluck and the German Army in the Battle of the Marne
Remarkable organisation and discipline, but major communication problems.
During the Battle of the Marne, his aim was to destroy the French 6th Army — making him General Maunoury's direct opponent, which he never succeeded in doing.
General Alexander Von Kluck (1846-1934):
Alexander Von Kluck was an active-duty soldier.
He served as a lieutenant in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 — where he was wounded twice, and awarded the Iron Cross.
In 1914, he commanded the German 1st army.
During the Battle of the Marne, he overlooked Paris and, naturally inclined to attack, his aim was to pursue General Franchet-d'Esperey's French 5th Army and Field Marshal French's British Expeditionary Corps, both of which had been in retreat for several days.
But surprised by Maunoury's army attack on its right flank, the German troops had to retreat to the Aisne and the Chemin des Dames.
In January 1915, one of his three sons, Lieutenant Egon Von Kluck, was killed in action near Nieuport in Belgium.
On 27 March 1915, on the Aisne front, the general was seriously wounded in the leg and right arm by shrapnel while inspecting an advance position in a trench.
(Ironically, his opponent, General Maunoury, had been wounded in the same circumstances 15 days earlier and lost his sight).
In April 1915, Von Kluck, who was hospitalised at Anizy-le-Château, received a visit from the German Emperor, William II.
In October 1916, due to his injury and his age (70), Von Kluck, agreed to retire.
In 1920, Von Kluck wrote a book justifying his actions during the Battle of the Marne: "The March on Paris".
He retired to Berlin where he died on 19 October 1934.
He is buried in the cemetery in the large wooded park of Stahnsdorf, not far from Berlin.
The German army in the Battle of the Marne
At the time of mobilisation in 1914, there were 3,800,000 men organised into eight armies under the command of Field Marshal von Moltke.
In 1914, the German army was the best in terms of organisation and discipline.
The army was under the direct orders of the General Staff, which was commanded by the Kaiser himself.
Both officers and non-commissioned officers were highly professional and enjoyed considerable prestige among the population.
On the other hand, the German communications system was failing.
In terms of operations management, the General Staff (OHL) led by Von Moltke was hampered not only by the failing health of its commander but also by a system of communication with the field armies that was unfit for the demands of military operations. Since the American Civil War, the telegraph and then the telephone had played a vital role in the management of large units operating over ever greater distances, but it came as a shock to discover that the 1st and 2nd Armies were beyond the reach of the OHL in Luxembourg. Since Von Moltke could not be moved to the field, the army commanders had to manage the battle themselves without being able to communicate with their commander. This partly explains the defeat at the Marne.
The German infantrymen wore a grey-green or field-grey uniform, "feldgrau", with rawhide boots with studded soles and the famous spiked helmet (Pickelhaube), designed in 1842 by King Frederick IV of Prussia.
It was made of iron-rimmed boiled leather. German soldiers had to wear a green helmet cover over it, but most of the time it was beige-grey, as the tip regularly caught on branches and was easy for the enemy to spot. The regimental number was painted in red on the front, then in green, which was less conspicuous.
The vast majority were equipped with the Mauser rifle and bayonet.
In the face of the enemy, German doctrine could allow for defensive phases: for example, they could entrench themselves behind their machine guns, with artillery support, or, if necessary, go underground as soon as the action stopped. Alternatively, they could outflank the resistance rather than tackle it head-on. According to German regulations, attacking meant firing forward (with artillery), with the bayonet attack eventually confirming victory.
The German army therefore favoured fire, unlike the French, who favoured shock and "the all-out attack".
In terms of heavy artillery and the use of machine guns, the German army was truly superior to the French army at the start of the war.
Helmuth Von Moltke (1848-1916)
In 1906, he succeeded Field Marshal Von Schlieffen (1833-1913) as commander of the German armies.
In 1905, Schlieffen had drawn up a deployment and operational plan for the armies in the event of a conflict with France.
Von Moltke was the nephew of Count Von Moltke (1800-1891), the winner of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, who was also in charge of the General Staff from 1857 to 1888.
In 1906, he succeeded Field Marshal Von Schlieffen (1833-1913) as commander of the German armies.
In 1905, Schlieffen had drawn up a deployment and operational plan for the armies in the event of a conflict with France.
Von Moltke was the nephew of Count Von Moltke (1800-1891), the winner of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, who was also in charge of the General Staff from 1857 to 1888.